We explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option. We study a hierarchy with a principal, a productive supervisor and an agent.
Introduction
Casual observation of real world contracts reveals that while some contracts limit the exit option by making it costly for the agent to quit, others grant the agent a relatively costless exit option. Costly exit options are common in the entertainment industry. For example, musicians or actors cannot easily walk away from the contract with their employers.
1 Similarly, many private contracts specify liability clauses that are essentially penalties in case of breaches. Relatively costless exit options exist for many administrative staff or line workers who are able to quit without many restrictions. This variety of exit options in contracts requires an analysis that endogenizes the exit option. In this paper, we present a novel explanation why some organizations give their workers an option to quit while others limit severely their exit option.
It is well established in the literature that granting an exit option, which is limiting the liability of the agent, reduces the principal's welfare while protecting the agent (e.g., Sappington, 1983) . However, this result is based on the assumption that the agent has a direct communication channel to the principal. If the agent's message to the principal can be manipulated by a third party, our analysis reveals that the principal is actually better off by granting an exit option to the agent.
can "exit" by returning the product for a full refund. 4 The existing literature has identified alternative justifications for return policies 5 , but our model proposes the limited communication between the manufacturer and the consumer regarding the retailer's unobservable quality maintenance as a new explanation.
What the size of the exit option (sometimes referred as "goodbye payment" 6 ) should be upon the agent's exit is another important question. Should the exit option entail payment to or from the agent? We show that, in the optimal contract, the principal should make the agent's payoff equal to his reservation level if he chooses to quit. If the agent's payoff is lower than the reservation level upon exit, it only increases the scope of the supervisor's manipulation of the report on the agent's type. If the agent's payoff is higher than the reservation level, it only increases the monetary transfer to the agent without further restricting the scope of the supervisor's manipulation.
One may wonder if the supervisor and the agent could jointly manipulate their report to increase their joint payoffs. In other words, we need to verify whether our analysis is robust to the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and agent. We show that it is indeed the case.
Unlike a traditional result in the literature on collusion (e.g., Tirole, 1986, Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993) , we find that the supervisor's individual incentives are not captured by the collective incentives. The reason is that the supervisor is the only one to report and, therefore, he will ignore the agent's payoff when it is profitable to do so. The exit option still limits the supervisor's report manipulation under collusion.
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Our work is closely related to the literature on limited liability. Although there have been many studies that use the agent's exit option as a modeling device, only a few papers have taken it as the main issue. The seminal work that extensively analyzes the issue in an adverse selection framework is Sappington (1983) . The author shows that limiting an agent's liability can bring down the principal's payoff from the first best level. In a moral hazard framework, Innes (1990) adopts the concept to financial contracts. Dewatripont, Legros and Matthews (2003) extend the analysis to renegotiable contracts. Lawarrée and Van Audenrode (1996) show that if the principal's output observation is imperfect, the agent's exit option prevents the principal from achieving the second best outcome under asymmetric information. Kim (1997) characterizes the necessary and the sufficient conditions to implement the first best contract when the agent's liability is limited. Laux (2001) studies a model with multi-project to show that the principal can relax the limited liability constraint by averaging out the liability of the agent between projects.
In the papers mentioned above, unlike ours, limiting the agent's liability is exogenous and always detrimental to the principal.
Finally, this paper is also related to the studies on exit and voice stemming from Hirschman's (1970) seminal work: dissatisfied employees tend to quit, especially if they cannot express their discontent. Hirschman assumed that exit is always an option to the agent and studied the benefit of adding voice. His work had a major influence in many disciplines and, indeed, it is now a common assumption in the incentive literature that economic agents have an exit option. For instance, Aghion and Tirole (1997) refer to the exit option as "the standard institution of letting subordinates quit if they are unhappy with their superiors' decision." In this paper, we go one step further to endogenize the exit option when the voice of the agent is limited.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model. Section three analyzes the optimal contract with and without the exit option, and discusses our findings.
Some extensions to the basic setup are discussed in section four. Section five concludes the paper. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
As a benchmark, we briefly review the optimal contract in the case of full information. When the principal can observe both the supervisor's and the agent's type, her problem is to maximize the expected payoff subject to the supervisor's and agent's individual rationality constraints.
These constraints induce them to sign the contract by guaranteeing a non-negative ex ante payoff.
There is no uncertainty in this setup, so the exit option is vacuous since the individual rationality constraints also guarantee a non-negative ex post payoff. The contract under full information gives the principal the first best outcome. The optimal output, * ij Q , is described by
Both the supervisor and the agent receive no rent in any case. For the rest of this paper, we will refer to these outputs as the benchmark for efficiency.
The optimality of granting an exit option
In this section, we look at the cases with and without an exit option for the agent. We then compare these two cases and show that the principal prefers to grant the exit option to the agent.
Collusion will be introduced in the next section.
The principal's problem with no exit option (P n )
Without the exit option, the principal is not restricted to protect a truthful agent from ending up with ex post negative payoff off-the-equilibrium path. The principal faces the following optimization problem (P n ):
The principal maximizes her expected payoff subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. The first constraints, (IR ij S ), are the individual rationality constraints (hereafter IR) for the supervisor, while the next constraints, (IR ij A ), are the IRs for the agent. The rest of the constraints are incentive compatibility constraints (hereafter IC) for the supervisor that induces truthful type reporting. Recall that the supervisor reports both his type and the agent's type. Thus, the ICs prevent the supervisor from misreporting not only his type but also the agent's type. For example, the constraint (IC LL,ij ) prevents the supervisor from any misreport while both the supervisor and the agent are type L. There are 12 incentive compatibility constraints for the supervisor. Since the agent has no communication channel to the principal, no ICs need to be applied to the agent.
One difficulty for the principal is that she does not have a standard screening device to prevent misreport about the agent's type. Indeed, the supervisor produces the output using his marginal cost, not the agent's marginal cost. To induce a truthful report, the principal must design the contract such that the supervisor's payoff does not depend on the agent's type. The following equations reflect this idea.
Equation (1) As in a standard adverse selection problem, the principal gives the supervisor an information rent if he is type L in order to prevent him from pretending to be type H, which is captured in (IC LH,HH ) and (IC LL,HL ). Lemma 1 in the appendix proves that both of these IC constraints are binding:
These constraints prevent the supervisor from lying about his own type. Together with (1) (1) and (2). Therefore, the rent given to the supervisor depends on his type, but not on the agent's type.
The principal's problem with the exit option (P e )
In this subsection, we analyze the case where the principal faces a constraint on the agent's liability. As mentioned before, thanks to the exit option, the agent could discard the contract if he anticipates that his ex post payoff will be negative after observing the supervisor's report.
In the previous section, it is important to observe that all the ex-post equilibrium payoffs for the agent are non-negative. So it seems that the exit option has no bite in this model. Since the supervisor and the agent know their type when they sign the contract, there is no new information provided by nature, therefore no uncertainty that could affect their payoffs. However, the limit on the agent's communication makes the exit option relevant. The ability of the agent to quit the contractual relationship relaxes the supervisor's incentive constraints and allows the principal to offer a more profitable contract. If the supervisor lied about the agent's type, the new contract would induce a negative payoff for the agent who would then quit, thus removing the supervisor's incentive to misreport the agent's type. In other words, the exit option has a bite off-theequilibrium path.
The principal's optimization problem with the exit option, (P e ), becomes as follows.
The difference from the previous problem appears in the ICs. In (P n ), where the agent is not allowed to quit after signing the contract, the supervisor does not consider the agent's payoff at all when he reports the types. This is possible because the agent cannot quit after the supervisor's report even if he knows that his ex post payoff will become negative.
Here in (P e ), when the supervisor reports the types, he must consider the agent's payoff. The reason is that the agent would rather quit if he anticipates that his ex post payoff is negative when choosing the output level in line with the supervisor's report. With a Leontief production technology, once the agent quits, the supervisor cannot supply the output by himself. Unlike the case of no exit option, the rent given to the supervisor can be made larger when the agent is type L (due to the larger output). This difference in rent creates an incentive for the type L supervisor to understate the agent's type but, again, the exit option prevents such misreporting. The rent no longer has to be the same regardless of the agent's type.
It seems that an exit option is costly to the principal. However, this is not the case. The exit option would be costly if it strengthened the agent's individual rationality constraints, i.e., if the exit option made the principal pay the agent more compared to the case of no exit option. But, in our model, the agent always receives his reservation payoff regardless of the exit option. Thus, the exit option is a costless device to discipline the supervisor's manipulation of the report on the agent's type. 11 Technically, less IC constraints are now binding in the principal's problem. We can summarize our main result of this paper in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a three-tier hierarchy with limited communication, the principal is better off
by granting an exit option to the agent.
Proof. See Appendix. □ It has been shown in the literature that granting an exit option to the agent constrains the principal's welfare. Proposition 3 presents a different result. The difference between our model and a standard adverse selection model stems from a hierarchical structure where the agent cannot communicate with the principal. With the exit option, the agent can quit if he anticipates an ex post negative payoff after the supervisor's report, making the supervisor's report effectively conditional on a non-negative ex post payoff for the agent. This implies that granting an exit option eases the supervisor's incentive compatibility constraints. For instance, (IC LH , HL ) is binding in (P n ) but relaxed in (P e ) because the RHS of the constraint becomes zero with the agent's exit option. By granting the exit option to the agent, the principal is giving him a "veto"
power. This, in turn, restricts the supervisor's manipulation. Protecting the agent through the exit option purely helps the principal since it enables her to adjust the incentive scheme without any cost. One could interpret the agent's ability to quit as a substitute for communication. Often, in hierarchies, an employee quits to express his protest against a supervisor or a company policy.
Resigning is sometimes seen as the only credible communication channel for some employees.
Extensions
In this section, we discuss some extensions of the basic setup such as the optimal exit option, the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent, the possibility that the agent has a voice, an alternative information structure, and an alternative production function.
Optimal exit option
We have shown that granting an exit option to the agent is optimal for the principal when there are communicational limits between them. However, we have just assumed that the principal does not pay a "goodbye" payment when the agent exercises the exit option. So a question arises: what is the optimal exit option? In this section, we argue that no payment upon exit, which makes the agent's payoff equal to the reservation payoff, is in fact optimal. A negative payment only increases the scope of the supervisor's manipulation, and a positive payment increases the monetary transfer to the agent.
To see this clearly, we assume that the agent's reservation payoff is 0 ≥ U , rather than zero.
The agent's IRs become
If the principal does not pay a goodbye payment when the agent quits, the RHS of the supervisor's ICs become
To show the optimality of no goodbye payment, suppose first that, the principal imposes a negative payment, which makes the agent's payoff equal to
. This is the case where the agent buys the exit option.
12 It does not affect the agent's IRs since the principal must guarantee the reservation payoff in order to make the agent participate in the contract.
However, it does affect the RHS of the supervisor's ICs:
The supervisor now can manipulate the agent's type even if the agent ends up receiving a payoff less than the reservation payoff by doing so. It increases the scope of the supervisor's manipulation and therefore the rent given to him. Thus, comparing to the case of no payment, the principal can never be better off by imposing a negative payment. 
At first glance, it seems that the RHS of the supervisor's ICs is different from that in the case of no goodbye payment in the way that the scope of the supervisor's manipulation decreases by ij x .
However, this is not the case. Indeed, there is no change in the RHS of the supervisor's ICs since ij w increases as well by ij x due to the binding IR constraints. Therefore, paying ij x upon exit is beneficial only to the agent. Thus, we can conclude as follows.
Proposition 4.
It is optimal to keep the agent's payoff at his reservation level upon exit.
Robustness to collusion
When the supervisor benefits from misreporting, he might be able to compensate (bribe) the agent who gets hurt by this misreporting. Also the agent might be able to bribe the supervisor to induce him to overstate the agent's type. Collusion is therefore an issue.
When collusion between the supervisor and the agent is possible, the supervisor considers not only his individual payoff but also the collective payoff that includes the agent's payoff. The supervisor may want to misreport the agent's and his own types for collective interest as well as his individual interest. Thus, the principal now must include the following coalition incentive constraints, hereafter CIC, (see, for example, Tirole, 1986 or Laffont and Martimort, 1997) .
The CICs prevent the supervisor from misreporting for joint benefit. For example, in (CIC LL,ij ), the LHS of the constraint is the joint payoff from the supervisor's truthful report when both players are type L, and the RHS is the joint payoff from misreporting by the supervisor.
In the previous sections, the exit option benefited the principal because it relaxed the supervisor's individual incentive constraints. However, the exit option may not relax the coalition incentive constraints since the supervisor and the agent can exchange bribes. This is particularly relevant since coalition incentives are usually stronger than individual incentives because collective misreporting opportunities encompass individual misreporting opportunities. 13 Therefore, there is a need to verify that our main result still holds.
To do so, we assume that the supervisor and the agent can sign a contract that specifies sidetransfers between them after signing the grand contract offered by the principal, but before reporting their types to the principal.
14 Without an exit option, the principal's problem, (P cn ), is (P n ) plus the CICs. The solution to (P cn ) is summarized in the following proposition. Q . This bunching occurs due to the same reason, i.e., the supervisor's individual incentive to misreport the agent's type, as mentioned in section 3. But, here we need careful explanation why the supervisor's concern on joint interest does not overtake or nullify his incentive to manipulate the agent's type for his own individual interest. Intuitively it is because the individual incentives of the supervisor can be stronger than the collective incentives. If, for instance, the supervisor benefits from misreporting the agent's type while the agent receives a negative payoff, the collective incentive would tell the supervisor not to make such report while the individual incentive would still induce him to do so. Therefore, bunching controls the individual incentives of the supervisor to misreport the agent's type.
However, the principal still has to deal with the collective incentive to overstate the agent's type. In this case, the agent could bribe the supervisor. To prevent this, we show the principal must give away a joint rent. An interesting result here is that not only the type L supervisor but also the type L agent receives a rent. Since the supervisor is the one reporting the types, collusion is relevant only in the case where the agent bribes the supervisor, not the other way around. If the supervisor overstates the agent's type, then the agent enjoys a benefit from cost reduction on his production. So the agent has an incentive to bribe the supervisor to overstate his type. To discipline this incentive, the principal has to give a rent as usual. But, this rent could go to either the supervisor or the agent. If the supervisor receives the rent, he has no collective incentive to overstate the agent's type. If the agent receives the rent, he has no incentive to bribe the supervisor. As long as the expected rents are the same, the principal would be indifferent between two cases. However, this intuition is misleading as it "forgets" the supervisor's individual incentives. If the principal did give the rent to the supervisor, the type L supervisor would understate the agent's type for his own interest even when he reports his own type truthfully (LH would be reported as LL). In other words, the rent to the supervisor can control his collective incentive, but, in some cases, increase his individual incentive to misreport. Thus, the principal chooses to give the rent to the agent, to prevent the agent from bribing the supervisor.
The supervisor enjoys a rent only because he can manipulate his type, not the agent's type. Note also that to minimize the rent given to the agent the principal distorts Q LH below the first best ). Therefore, the exit option still helps the principal.
Alternative information structure
The timing of our model assumes that both the supervisor and the agent know each other's type when signing the contract. To verify the robustness of our result, we discuss an alternative information structure: the supervisor and the agent know only their own type when they sign the contract but find out each other's type after signing the contract.
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Since the other player's type is unknown when signing the contract, the IR constraints in the basic model should be replaced with the ones in expected terms as follows.
In this setting, the principal has more degrees of freedom since he could give an ex-post negative payoff to the agent and the supervisor. So granting an exit option by making ex-post payoffs non-negative may be costly to her. Therefore, it is necessary to verify our result under this alternative information structure. The following claim shows that our result still holds.
Claim. The principal's payoff is the same in the optimal contract when the IRs in (P
The claim shows that, without an exit option, the principal receives the same payoff with the new IR constraints. Therefore granting the exit option will still benefit her. Intuitively, it is because, to induce a truthful report on the agent's type, the principal still has to give the supervisor the same payoff independent of the agent's type as shown in equations (1) and (2).
This makes the principal unable to give the supervisor ex-post negative payoffs. The principal could give ex-post negative payoffs to the agent, but that would not improve the principal's payoff since all IRs for the agent are binding. 16 Therefore, even if the supervisor and the agent do not learn each other's type prior to their participation, the principal's payoff is unaffected.
Conclusion
The exit option has usually been treated as exogenous in the contract theory literature. The literature relies on the existence of some legal restrictions, such as bankruptcy law, corporate investment regulation, and minimum wage law. The role of these exogenous constraints has been to guarantee the agents an ex post reservation payoff, thus limiting the principal's welfare.
In this paper, we allowed the principal to choose to grant an exit option to the agent if she wants to do so. We have focused our analyses on a hierarchy where the communication channel is limited to the supervisor. In this type of hierarchy, we showed that the principal becomes better off by granting an exit option to the agent. By doing so, the principal gives the agent at the low end of the hierarchy a right to discard the contract, which imposes a restriction on the manipulation of information by the supervisor at the middle of the hierarchy. Thus, the exit option can be seen as a remedy for communicational limits in the hierarchy. Our result still held under the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent. We also showed that it is optimal for the principal to pay the agent his reservation payoff when he exercises the exit option.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first find the binding constraints to solve for the optimal output levels. Notice that LHS of (IC LL , LH ) and the RHS of (IC LH , LL ), and the RHS of (IC LL , LH ) and the The transfers are obtained from the binding constraints:
LHS of (IC LH
replacing the transfers with their values in the objective function, we have
The first order condition gives the optimal output schedule. The solution satisfies the assumption made at the beginning and also satisfies all the constraints. The expected IRs for the agent as well as for the supervisor in (P 0 cn ) become ex-post IRs. Thus,
